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up’ may be initiated. 
Asia Pacific School  of  Economics and Government 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
 
http://apseg.anu.edu.au 
International and Development Economics Working Paper 04-5 
  
 
 
Bridging the Barriers:  
Knowledge Connections, Productivity, and Capital 
Accumulation* 
 
R. Quentin Grafton§ 
Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government 
 The Australian National University 
 
Tom Kompas 
Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government 
The Australian National University 
 
P. Dorian Owen 
Department of Economics 
University of Otago  
 
Abstract  
 
The paper explains the large differences in cross-country productivity performance by 
modeling and testing the effects of social barriers to communication on productivity and 
capital accumulation. In an optimal growth model, social barriers to communication that 
impede the formation of knowledge connections are shown to reduce both transitory and 
steady-state levels of total factor productivity (TFP), per capita consumption, and 
reproducible capital. A ‘bridging’ parameter in the growth model that lowers the disutility of 
forming knowledge connections generates testable and dynamic implications about the 
effects of social barriers on capital, consumption, and productivity. Extensive empirical 
testing of the theoretical propositions yields a robust and theoretically consistent result — 
linguistic barriers to communication reduce productivity and capital accumulation. The 
findings provide a theoretical justification and a robust explanation for cross-country 
differences in TFP, and fresh insights into how productivity ‘catch up’ may be initiated. (JEL 
O41, C61, C21) 
Key Words: knowledge connections, productivity, economic growth 
Running Title: Knowledge Connections and Productivity  
 
§Contact Author: 
R. Quentin Grafton 
Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government 
J.G. Crawford Building (Bldg 13) 
Ellery Crescent 
The Australian National University 
Acton, ACT 0200 
AUSTRALIA 
 
tel +61-2-6125-6558 
fax +61-2-6125-5570 
email quentin.grafton@anu.edu.au
November 2004 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
The existence of enormous differences in the levels of productivity and factor accumulation 
across countries constitutes one of the most perplexing issues in economics. Many 
explanations have been offered for the large disparities, including the initial level of capital 
stocks (physical, natural and human), human capital externalities, macroeconomic stability, 
quality of institutions, geography, trade openness, and rules over foreign investment. 
Increasingly, economists are exploring the ways that public and civic institutions, social 
mores and norms of behavior, and social networks influence economic activity. Such analysis 
recognizes that economic growth goes beyond factor accumulation and is also linked to social 
interactions between people.  
In this paper we focus on the macroeconomic effects of social barriers to communication 
and their consequences for total factor productivity (TFP) and (human or reproducible) 
capital accumulation. In an optimal growth model, we show that social barriers impede 
knowledge communication links that otherwise make labor more productive. The model 
generates testable propositions, namely, that lower values of a ‘bridging’ parameter raise the 
disutility of forming knowledge connections across agents, which, in turn, reduces both 
transitory and steady-state levels of TFP, per capita consumption, and capital (physical or 
human). Extensive empirical testing of the theoretical propositions yields a robust and 
theoretically consistent result — linguistic barriers to communication reduce productivity and 
capital accumulation.  
The theoretical and empirical results are consistent with a number of important stylized 
facts at a regional and global level and stress the importance of social barriers to 
communication on economic performance. The findings help explain the persistence of 
differences in cross-country TFP, the existence of country growth laggards and leaders, and 
provide fresh insights as to how countries might initiate productivity ‘catch up’. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section II solves an optimal growth model of the 
effects of social barriers to communication and analyzes the implications for TFP and factor 
accumulation. Section III describes the data and the empirical model used to test the 
theoretical propositions. Section IV reports the empirical results. The economic implications 
of social impediments to communication are examined in section V. Concluding remarks are 
offered in section VI. 
 
II.  Knowledge Connections and Social Barriers to Communication  
Our modeling of the macroeconomic effects of social barriers to communication on 
productivity and growth is novel, although Parente and Prescott (2000) also emphasize the 
importance of barriers to knowledge, in particular a lack of competition, that impede the 
adoption of new technologies. Our work has similarities to important contributions by Lazear 
(1999), Nettle (2000), Rauch (2001) and Grafton, Knowles and Owen (2004) that emphasize 
the importance of linguistic and cultural diversity for, respectively, exchange and trade 
between individuals, aggregate per capita GDP, international trade, and per capita income 
and productivity. We also owe a debt to those who have tested for the interaction between 
economic performance and various characterizations of social capital, social infrastructure or 
social capability (Easterly and Levine 1997; Hall and Jones 1999; Helliwell and Putnam 
1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; Temple and Johnson 1998; Zak and Knack 2001). Others, 
such as Bénabou (1996), stress the importance of heterogeneity, especially with respect to 
inequality and school funding, while Gradstein and Justman (2002) examine the importance 
of social polarization in terms of human capital formation. None of the above approaches, 
however, develops a theoretical model of the effects of social barriers to communication on 
macroeconomic performance, nor has any previous study linked these effects to explain 
differences in both factor accumulation and productivity. 
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Using an optimal growth model, we posit that economy-wide output is increasing in the 
level of a reproducible capital stock (physical or human), labor, and the number of knowledge 
communication links between agents. Our interpretation of the model is that communication 
links help in the creation of productivity-enhancing ideas, and also in the transmission of tacit 
knowledge. Differences across agents make communication and interaction worthwhile via 
‘cross-fertilization’ of knowledge and ideas — complementary knowledge — but social 
barriers that inhibit communication or interchange (such as linguistic differences) raise the 
cost of mutually beneficial and productivity-enhancing communications.  
Our modeling implicitly incorporates three key ideas. One, cooperation and group 
interactions enable economies to use large amounts of specialized knowledge (Becker and 
Murphy 1992; Lucas 1988; Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991). Two, although knowledge is 
inherently nonrival, the creation and transfer of tacit knowledge or ‘know-how’ is highly 
dependent on communication links within social groups (Brown and Duguid 2000; Coleman, 
Katz, and Menzel 1966; Marshall 1916; Powell 1990; Ryan and Gross 1943; Saxenian 1994; 
Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2004) and also by ‘weak ties’ or ‘bridges’ (Granovetter 1973) 
across social groups (Rogers 1995; Meyer 1998; Valente 1995). Three, individuals 
communicate more easily the greater the similarity between them (Tarde 1895; Lazarsfeld 
and Merton 1954; Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan 2000), and communication and 
cooperation across social groupings, such as across linguistic barriers, is often much more 
limited than within groups (Bénabou 1996; Borjas 1992 and 1995; Burt 2002; Davis 1967; 
Schelling 1978; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif 1961; Solo 1967).  
 
A. The Model 
To capture the effects of social barriers to communication we assume that a representative 
agent’s utility function, given by equation (1), depends positively on per capita consumption 
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at time t, c(t), and negatively on the effort required to establish knowledge connections across 
agents defined by ( ( ))s tε , i.e.,  
   
(1) 
1
0
( ) ( ( ))( , ( ))
1
z
tc t s tU c s e dt
z
θ
ρεε θ β
−∞ −⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦∫  
 
In (1), θ  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (assumed to lie between 
zero and one), z  is a communication disutility coefficient that is greater than one, ρ  is the 
rate of time preference and β  is an economy-wide ‘bridging’ parameter that affects the ease 
of establishing knowledge connections. The bridging parameter is taken to be sufficiently 
positive to ensure that ( , ( ))U c sε  is jointly concave and is bounded from above by the 
assumption that, even in the absence of social barriers, establishing knowledge links between 
individuals is always costly. Effort in forming connections, ε(s(t)), is an implicit function of 
the number of connections, where ( )ε ⋅  is the effort function and s(t) is the number of 
knowledge connections. The number of connections has a lower bound of zero. 
Equation (1) is consistent with an intertemporal consumption/leisure model of individual 
preferences, and the negative effect of ( ( ))s tε on utility incorporates the notion that the time 
involved in making knowledge connections is privately costly. An increase in the bridging 
parameter β , which makes it easier for agents to form knowledge connections, lowers the 
‘utility-cost’ of forming connections. The bridging parameter represents the initial conditions 
in the economy, such as the degree of linguistic diversity, that help determine the cost of 
establishing knowledge links with other people. Low levels of the bridging parameter would 
represent an economy where social barriers to communication, such as a lack of a common 
language, make it expensive to establish knowledge links in terms of the disutility of effort. 
To complete the model, aggregate output is determined by 
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(2) 1 20( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )Y t s t N t K t
α αα=  
 
where 0α  is economy-wide productivity, N(t) is the size of the labor force, s(t)N(t) is 
knowledge connections-augmented units of labor where the productivity of labor is 
increasing in the number of economy-wide knowledge connections, and K(t) is the 
reproducible capital stock (physical or human). For convenience, we assume a one-to-one 
mapping between the effort from making knowledge connections and the number of 
connections, i.e., ( ( )) ( )s t s tε = , and that (2) exhibits constant returns to scale. Neither 
assumption, however, is essential to derive our results.  
In per capita form, and suppressing t, the economy’s aggregate production function is 
given by 
 
(3) 1 20y s k
α αα=  
 
where y = Y/N and k = K/N.  The change in the reproducible capital stock with respect to time 
is governed by 
 
(4) k y c= −&  
 
 
B. Theoretical Results 
To solve the optimization problem we maximize (1) subject to (4), the initial condition 
 and the necessary feasibility constraints. We note that c and s are both control 
variables, and define 
0(0)k = k
λ  as the co-state variable.  
Along the optimal path, both (4) and the following necessary conditions must be satisfied 
for all t: 
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 (5) c θ λ− =  
 
(6) 1 2
1
1
1 0
zs s kα αλα αβ
−
−=  
(7) 1 2 10 2s k
α αλ ρ α αλ
−= −&  
 
Equation (6) shows that along the optimal growth path the representative agent will ensure 
that the instantaneous marginal disutility from making knowledge connections equals the 
instantaneous marginal benefit from production. Higher effort today, and thus lower current 
utility, generates more knowledge connections, greater capital accumulation, higher output  
and, ultimately, larger future consumption.  
Both output and the effort from making connections are increasing in the number of 
connections. For any number of connections less than the optimal steady-state  the 
marginal utility from consumption from an extra connection exceeds the disutility of effort, 
leading to an increase in the desired number of connections. Higher levels of the economy-
wide bridging parameter 
*s
β  reduce the disutility of effort from making connections and, thus, 
increase both transitional and steady-state number of connections. An increased number of 
connections, in turn, has dynamic implications because it raises both the capital-labor ratio 
and per capita consumption along the optimal growth path, and also at the steady state.  
The intuition for the dynamic effort-output relationship can be shown with equations (5) 
and (6) that, together, imply 
 
(8) ( ) 12 1/( )0 1 zs c k ααθα α β −−= . 
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Thus a once-and-for-all increase in the bridging parameter β , which reduces the disutility 
associated with making connections, raises the number of knowledge connections along the 
optimal growth path. Equation (8), along with the necessary conditions, can be used to derive 
the following transition paths:1
 
(9) 
1 1 2 1
1 1 1 1 1
1
0 1 2
zz
z z z z zcc k c
α α α θα
α α α α αα α β α ρθ
−−− − − − −⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
&  
and 
(10) 
1 1 2 1
1 1 1 1 1
0 1
zz
z z z z zk k
α α α θα
α α α α αα α β
−
− − − − −= −& c c . 
 
At the steady state, because  
(11) 1 21
0 2
s kα αρα α
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, 
per-capita consumption ( c ) is a function of the steady-state reproducible capital ( k ) and is 
expressed as follows: 
∗ ∗
 
(12) 
2
c k ρα
∗ ∗ ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
 
Given (8) and the steady-state value for consumption given by (12) it follows that 
(13) 
1
1
2 2 1
0 2 0 1
2
z
k k k
α
θ α
α αρα α α α β ρα
− −
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ =⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
. 
Thus the steady-state values for consumption and reproducible capital can be written as 
 
(14) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
* ( 1)
0 1 2
2
z zz zc α α θα α θα α α θρ α α α ρ βα
− + − − + −⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤= ⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
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and 
(15) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
* ( 1
0 1 2
z zz zk α α θα α θα α α θα α α ρ β− + − − )+ −⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦ . 
 
These results yield the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 1:  A lower value of the bridging parameter β reduces both the transitory 
and steady-state levels of per capita consumption and capital.  
  
It follows immediately that, if , which is required for convexity in the effort-disutility 
relationship, and 0 < 
1z >
θ  < 1, proposition 1 holds true.  The significance of this result is that 
the initial conditions, or policy actions, that influence the cost of forming knowledge 
connections have both transitory and steady-state implications. The implication is that actions 
successful at overcoming social barriers to communication will increase the transmission and 
diffusion of tacit knowledge that, in turn, will increase both the growth and steady-state levels 
of capital and consumption. 
The intuition for our results is that higher levels of the bridging parameter lower the costs 
of forming knowledge connections and, therefore, increase the knowledge connections-
augmented rate of return given by 
1 1 2 1
1 1 1 1 1
1
0 1
zz
z z z z zk c
α α α θα
α α α α α
2α α β α
−−− − − − −  in equation (9). A higher rate 
of return on capital induces factor accumulation and raises the steady-state values of both per 
capita consumption and capital. By contrast to a comparable Ramsey model, where the 
steady-state value of capital depends only on the rate of time preference and is also policy 
invariant, we find that the level of the bridging parameter affects both the transition paths and 
steady-state values of capital and consumption. 
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We can derive the theoretical implications of the bridging parameter for TFP by first 
substituting (12), or the expression for per-capita consumption as a function of steady-state 
reproducible capital, into (8) — the derived expression for the number of knowledge 
connections — to obtain,  
(16) ( ) 211 11
11
0 1
2
z
z zzs k
θ α θαα αα ρα α β α
− −−− −− ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
By substituting (16) into (3) — the expression for per capita output — and multiplying by N, 
we can derive a closed-form solution for aggregate output given by, 
 
(17) 
1 2 1 2
2 2
1 1
( ) ( )1  
z zY AN K
α α θ α α θα αα α
− −− + +− −= , 
where  is TFP and derived to be A
(18) 
1
1 1
1
1 1
0 0 1
2
( )
z
z zA
θαα ααα αρα α α βα
−
−− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
 
An intertemporal version of TFP can also be derived that shows that the time path for 
productivity is increasing in the bridging parameter. This result, and also equation (18), yield 
the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: A lower value of the bridging parameter β  reduces both the transitory 
and steady-state levels of total factor productivity. 
 
Our result provides a causal explanation for cross-country differences in TFP, and also 
implies that policy actions that can overcome social barriers to forming knowledge 
connections can initiate productivity ‘catch up’.  Both propositions 1 and 2 can be tested 
using cross-country data and measures of TFP, factor accumulation (physical and human), 
social barriers to communication, and other variables.  
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 III. Tests of the Propositions 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003) is the source of data on three 
measures of social barriers to communication based on linguistic, ethnic and religious 
fractionalization. Fractionalization, especially linguistic fractionalization, provides a measure 
of the level of an economy-wide bridging parameter where lower levels of the parameter are 
represented by higher levels of fractionalization. In our testing we also include explanatory 
variables that may mitigate the effects of social barriers to communication on productivity, 
such as the level of social infrastructure, trade openness, measures of mass communications, 
and population density.  
Each fractionalization measure is calculated as one minus a Herfindahl index of 
ethnolinguistic group share and represents the probability of two randomly selected 
individuals being from a different social group, i.e., 
 
(19) 21
n
i j
j
FRAC f= − i∑  
 
where jif  is the share of (linguistic, ethnic or religious) group j in country i. The primary 
source of the Alesina et al. (2003) fractionalization measures is the Encyclopedia Britannica 
(2000), which provides data on 1,055 major linguistic groups for 201 countries or dependent 
territories. Using other data sources for cross-checking, Alesina et al. (2003) calculate, for the 
early to mid 1990s, measures of ethnic (Ethnic), linguistic (Language) and religious 
(Religion) fractionalization for up to 215 countries. The three fractionalization measures we 
use have been investigated by Alesina et al. (2003) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) as 
possible determinants of long-run growth. We emphasize, however, that our paper is the first 
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to examine the effects of the Alesina et al. (2003) fractionalization measures on productivity 
and capital accumulation. 
In addition to the Alesina et al. (2003) indexes, we also use Fearon’s (2003) cultural 
fractionalization measure, Culture, which is based on the structural distance between 
languages. For example, Culture accounts for the fact that linguistic barriers (e.g., in Cyprus) 
between Greek and Turkish are much greater, because they are structurally unrelated 
languages, than (e.g., in Ukraine) between Russian and Ukrainian which are Indo-European, 
Slavic and East Branch languages (Fearon 2003, pp. 211-212). All four fractionalization 
indexes reflect the number and relative sizes of distinct social groups within a country. Cross-
country summary statistics of the fractionalization measures and other key variables are 
provided in Table 1.  
 
A. Proposition 1 
Proposition 1 implies that the higher is the initial level of social barriers to communication 
(lower β ), the lower will be the transitory and steady-state levels of reproducible capital 
(physical or human). We test this proposition by estimating the following equations:  
 
(20) iiiii RGDPWAYSFRACAYS µδδδδ ++++=∆ 60ln60 3210  
 
(21) iiiii RGDPWKAPWFRACKAPW νγγγγ ++++=∆ 60ln65lnln 3210  
 
where ∆AYS is the change in Barro and Lee’s (2001) measure of the average years of 
schooling in the total population aged 15 years and over between 1960 and 1999, ∆lnKAPW 
is the change in the natural log of real physical capital stock per worker between 1965 and 
1990 (from the Penn World Tables) and subscript i denotes observations for country i.  
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For FRAC, as well as the measures constructed by Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon 
(2003), we also use an ethnolinguistic fractionalization index for 1960, ELF, obtained from 
La Porta et al. (1999).  Although Alesina et al (2003) argue that fractionalization measures 
exhibit considerable time persistence, ELF is, on balance, our preferred regressor to test 
proposition 1 because it is dominated by estimates dated around the base-period, thus 
providing more of an initial measure of the social barriers to communication. AYS60 and 
lnKAPW65 are base-period values for the respective capital stock proxies. lnRGDPW60 is 
(the natural log of) real gross domestic product per worker in international prices in 1960. 
The appended error terms, µi and νi, are country specific and assumed to be independently 
and normally distributed. Consistency with proposition 1 requires that the estimated 
coefficient on the base-period fractionalization measure be negative and statistically 
significant. 
 
B. Proposition 2 
To test whether higher social barriers to communication (lower β ) have a negative effect on 
TFP, as predicted, we estimate variants of the following reduced-form model: 
 
(22) 0 1 2 3ln e  i iTFP Ethnic Language R ligion Controli iπ π π π ψ= + + + + +ξ . 
 
In (22), lnTFP is the Hall-Jones proxy for the natural log of TFP and iξ is the country-specific 
error term. The Hall-Jones measure for TFP is solved as a labor-augmenting measure of 
productivity from a Cobb-Douglas production function, given estimates of output per worker, 
physical capital stock, labor input and years of schooling. Hall and Jones (1999) assume that 
the relative efficiency of labor is a piecewise linear function of years of schooling and that the 
capital share is equal to one third.2  
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The term ψ  in (22) is a vector of parameters to be estimated and Control is a vector of 
regressors to control for variables such as institutional quality, population density, trade 
openness, and measures of mass communication that may influence TFP. If social barriers to 
communication do affect productivity, as predicted by proposition 2, then we would expect 
the estimated coefficients for at least some of the fractionalization regressors, especially 
linguistic fractionalization, to be negative and statistically significant. 
 
IV.  Empirical Results 
The tests for proposition 1 and 2 are presented separately because they require different data. 
Our primary focus is on the effects on productivity of social barriers to communication 
because we hypothesize that it is knowledge links that make labor more productive, which, in 
turn, induces capital accumulation.  
 
A. Capital Accumulation 
Table 2 provides the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of (20) and (21) that test 
proposition 1 using alternative fractionalization indexes to proxy the effects of social barriers 
to communication. The reported diagnostics include Doornik and Hansen’s (1994) χ2 test for 
normality of the errors (denoted Normality) and an F-form of an asymptotic test for 
heteroskedasticity (denoted White-Hetero) based on regressing the squared residuals on the 
original regressors and their (non-redundant) squares (White 1980). For two of the models 
estimated for ∆lnKAPW the heteroskedasticity test (in columns (5) and (6)) is statistically 
significant; however, the use of heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors has little effect 
on the statistical significance of the coefficients.  
In all models, the relevant base-period capital stock measure has a significant negative 
coefficient at the 5-percent level of significance, or better. Base-period real GDP per worker 
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has a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 10-percent level for the model 
in column (3) and at the 5-percent level or better in the other models. As hypothesized, the 
estimated coefficients for ELF are negative and statistically different from zero at the 1-
percent level of significance in both the human capital and physical capital equations.  
To test the robustness of our results to different fractionalization measures, we also 
include the three Alesina et al. (2003) fractionalization indexes as regressors in variants of 
(20) and (21). The results indicate that ethnic, but not linguistic or religious, fractionalization 
has a negative coefficient that is statistically significant at the 5-percent level in both the 
∆AYS and ∆lnKAPW equations. However, the Fearon fractionalization index, Culture, which 
is also a measure of linguistic fractionalization, does have a negative coefficient that is 
statistically significant in the human capital equation at the 5-percent level. Although 
measurement of human and physical capital stocks is problematical, our results do support 
the hypothesis that the larger the economy-wide social barriers to communication, the lower 
the rate of capital accumulation.  
 
B. Total Factor Productivity: OLS Results 
Table 3 provides OLS estimates of variants of equation (22) that tests proposition 2.  As far 
as we are aware, Table 3 provides the first reported test of the effects of the Alesina et al. 
(2003) measures of fractionlization on cross-country TFP.3 In column (1), which includes 
only the fractionalization measures and no control regressors, the coefficients on Ethnic and 
Language have the predicted negative signs and are both statistically significant at the 5-
percent level.  
In addition to the fractionalization measures, other factors are also likely to influence 
TFP. Consequently, column (2) gives the results of a model that includes, separately, the two 
components of Hall and Jones’ (1999) social infrastructure index. The two components are 
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GADP, an index of government antidiversion policies, which incorporates equally-weighted 
measures of law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation and 
government repudiation of contracts, and YrsOpen, an index of the extent to which countries 
are open to international trade.4  In the model in column (2), the coefficient on Ethnic is no 
longer statistically significant, but the results for Language are robust to the addition of these 
controls.  Given our hypotheses about the nature of the transmission of productivity-
enhancing ideas, we would expect linguistic differences to be the most important barriers to 
communication across networks.  
Diagnostic tests suggest the presence of heteroskedasticity (with the White-Hetero test 
statistically significant at the 5-percent level for the models in columns (2), (3) and (4)). 
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are also reported, although these give qualitatively 
similar results to the conventional standard errors.  
Given the hypothesized importance of linguistic barriers, we re-estimated the initial 
model, but included only a measure of linguistic differences (Fearon’s fractionalization 
index, Culture) along with the controls GADP and YrsOpen. Column (3) reports these results; 
the coefficient on Fearon’s index is negative, as predicted, and statistically significant at the 
5-percent level.   
The results in columns (4) to (6) provide further evidence on the robustness of the initial 
results.  Studentized residuals and leverage statistics were calculated for the model in column 
(2) in order to identify potential outliers and/or influential observations.5 Column (4) presents 
the results from re-estimating the model, but with the observations identified by the above 
statistics removed from the sample, in order to check the sensitivity of the results to the 
omission of outliers and/or influential observations.  While the overall goodness of fit 
improves and the coefficient on Language increases in absolute size, the results are 
qualitatively unchanged.   
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To test whether the effects of fractionalization vary between rich and poor countries, we 
also re-estimated the model in column (2) excluding OECD countries; these results are given 
in column (5) and are very similar to those in columns (2) and (4). As a further check on the 
sensitivity of the results, column (6) provides estimates using an alternative measure of 
lnTFP obtained from Islam (1995). As predicted by proposition 2, the coefficient for 
Language is negative and statistically significant at the 5-percent level throughout. 
 
C. Total Factor Productivity: Robustness Results 
As a check on the robustness of the results in Table 3, we applied a general-to-specific (Gets) 
algorithm implemented in PcGets (Hendry and Krolzig 2001) to select a preferred model for 
TFP. The essence of Gets modelling is to start from a general unrestricted model that is 
‘congruent’ with the data, i.e., displays no evidence of misspecification.  Variables with 
coefficients that are not statistically significant are eliminated in order to obtain a simpler 
congruent model that encompasses rival models in the sense that no important information is 
lost (e.g., Hendry 1995, p. 365). 6    
The general-to-specific approach has been significantly enhanced by Hendry and Krolzig 
(1999) and Krolzig and Hendry (2001).  Their innovations include: examining multiple 
search paths, considering only model reductions that do not fail diagnostic tests in order to 
retain congruence, employing ‘pre-search simplification’, using overlapping sub-sample 
testing to aid in the overall assessment of the ‘reliability’ of the significance of the 
coefficients, implementing encompassing tests to distinguish between competing candidate 
congruent models that emerge from different search paths, and using an information criterion 
to make a final selection if encompassing tests fail to pick a unique dominant final model.7  
Monte Carlo evidence to date (e.g., Krolzig and Hendry 2001; Hendry and Krolzig 2001, 
2004) suggests that the different elements of the overall algorithm combine to give 
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impressive properties: the size of the model selection process is close to the nominal size of 
the tests used in the search such that the power approaches that obtained if the process started 
from the data generating process.8  In particular, Hoover and Perez (2004), in a Monte Carlo 
study designed to reflect the ‘realistic’ setting of cross-country growth regressions, show that 
a cross-section version of a Gets algorithm outperforms Levine and Renelt’s (1992) and Sala-
i-Martin’s (1997) versions of Leamer’s (1983) extreme-bounds approach to model selection.9
Table 4, column (1) reports results for the model specified in equation (22) where, in 
addition to GADP and YrsOpen, the control variables include measures of mass 
communication, population density and interaction effects. Given that social barriers to 
communication impede the exchange of productivity-enhancing ideas, we hypothesize that 
physical infrastructure that aids in communications may mitigate the negative impact on TFP. 
We also test whether increased proximity between people, as measured by population density 
(Popn Density) and road density (Road Density), reduces the effect of social communication 
barriers. Interaction effects are included to test the hypothesis that increases in mass 
communications or population density reduce the negative partial effect of linguistic 
fractionalization on TFP. Due to the heavily parameterized nature of the model given in 
column (1) of Table 4, it is not surprising that few of the individual coefficients are 
statistically significant at conventional levels.10  Nevertheless, we use this initial model as a 
starting point for the application of a general-to-specific simplification process. 
The results in column (2) of Table 4 are the final specific model selected using the Gets 
model selection algorithm applied to the model in column (1), Table 4.  Two measures of 
social barriers to communication, Language and Religion, are selected and have coefficients 
that are statistically significant at the 1-percent level and have the hypothesized negative sign. 
One of the measures of mass communications, the number of telephones per capita 
(Telephones), has a coefficient with the hypothesized positive sign that is also statistically 
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significant at the 1-percent level.  Another mass communication measure is included in the 
selected interaction term Language*Radios.  Its coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5-percent level, implying that the negative effects of linguistic 
fractionalization are reduced with improvements in mass communication, proxied by the 
number of radios per capita. 
Further robustness tests are provided in columns (3) and (4) in Table 4. Column (3) 
contains median regression (least absolute errors) estimates for the final selected model to 
assess the robustness of the results to potential outliers.  Point estimates and standard errors 
based on the design-matrix-bootstrapping estimator (Buchinsky 1998) produce qualitatively 
similar conclusions to column (2) with the estimated coefficients for linguistic and religious 
fractionalization both negative and statistically significant at the 1-percent level. Column (4) 
presents the results of the final model selected from a general-to-specific search applied to a 
model of the form in column (1) of Table 4, except that Fearon’s (2003) Culture index 
replaces the three Alesina et al. (2003) measures and the Language variable in the interaction 
terms.  Again, the linguistic diversity measure (Culture) is selected in the final model and has 
a negative coefficient that is statistically significant at the 5-percent level.  In addition, both 
the trade openness measure and telephones per capita are also selected in the final model.  
Overall, the robustness tests indicate that the estimated coefficients for the linguistic 
fractionalization indexes have a negative and statistically significant on TFP. These results 
are consistent with proposition 2, namely, that higher economy-wide social barriers to 
communication have a negative impact on productivity. 
 
D. Total Factor Productivity: IV Results 
A possible concern with the estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4 is that, while it may be 
reasonable to treat the fractionalization measures as exogenous, several of the controlling 
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variables may be endogenous. If this is the case, then OLS estimates will be inconsistent. To 
address this issue, we use instrumental variables that should be uncorrelated with iξ  in (22), 
but strongly correlated with the potentially endogenous variables.  
Table 5 presents results obtained using instrumental variables (IV) estimation in which all 
variables other than the fractionalization measures are treated as potentially endogenous.  We 
follow Hall and Jones (1999) in including Frankel and Romer’s (1999) (natural log) predicted 
trade share (based on a trade model including exogenous gravity variables), lnFraRom, and 
the fraction of the population speaking a European language, EurFrac, in the instrument set.  
Hall and Jones (1999) also use distance from the equator as an instrument, but, following 
Sachs’s (2003) argument that this is a poor proxy for geographical factors such as climate, we 
instead use mean annual temperature, MeanTemp, which provides better fits for the first-stage 
regressions, as well as the proportion of land area within 100km of the coast, LT100km, and 
total land area, LandArea.  In addition, we include a measure of ‘state antiquity’, StateHist, 
constructed by Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman (2002), which their empirical results 
suggest is a significant predictor of Hall and Jones’ (1999) composite social infrastructure 
measure.11 We also include the interactions between linguistic fractionalization and a subset 
of the geographical instruments in some of the instrument sets to allow for the endogeneity of 
interaction terms involving fractionalization and the other right-hand-side variables, such as 
Language*Radios. 
Table 5 provides evidence on the suitability of the sets of instruments used.  To check on 
the explanatory power of the instrument sets, the values of R2 for the first-stage regressions of 
each right-hand-side endogenous variable on the instruments, including a constant, were 
calculated.  We also calculated p-values of the F-statistics for the joint null hypothesis that 
the coefficients on all the instruments (including the exogenous regressors) are zero; these are 
not reported in Table 5 because they are all 0.000. These p-values, reflecting the high R2 
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values, indicate that the instrument sets are strongly associated with the endogenous right-
hand-side variables.   
To check on the correlation between the residuals and the instruments we calculated 
Sargan’s (1964) general misspecification test for instrumental variables estimation of over-
identified models.  The test statistic, denoted Sargan χ2 in Table 5, is obtained as NR2 from 
the regression of the IV residuals on the set of all instruments and is asymptotically 
distributed as a central chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-
identifying restrictions.  The hypothesis that the over-identifying instruments are independent 
of the error terms is not rejected for any of the models.  We also report a Hausman test of the 
consistency (Hausman 1978) of the OLS estimates by comparison with IV based on the 
selected instrument set(s); under the null that the OLS estimates are consistent, the test is 
asymptotically distributed as a central chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of potentially endogenous right-hand-side variables.  The results imply that OLS 
estimates are not significantly affected by endogeneity for the models in columns (1) and (3) 
of Table 5, but are inconsistent when compared to the IV estimates in column (5), using a 5-
percent significance level, and more marginally, at the 10-percent significance level, for 
columns (2) and (4). 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 report the IV estimation results for the models 
corresponding to the OLS estimates in column (2) and (3) in Table 3. Again, both sets of 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that linguistic fractionalization has a negative 
impact on TFP. The results presented in column (3) in Table 5 correspond to the model 
estimated in column (2) of Table 4, i.e., including those variables retained in the final model 
from the OLS-based general-to-specific selection process. Apart from a reduction in the 
statistical significance of the coefficient on Telephones, the IV results are very similar to 
those obtained using OLS, an interpretation supported by the non-rejection of the Hausman 
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test. Column (4) in Table 5 is the final model obtained by commencing with the general 
model in Table 4, column (1) and applying the general-to-specific simplification, but based 
throughout on IV estimation, using the specified instrument set, rather than OLS.  One 
component of Hall and Jones’ (1999) social infrastructure proxy, YrsOpen, and Road Density 
are selected, in place of Telephones, but linguistic and religious fractionalization continue to 
have a significant negative effect.12 In addition, the role of communications, proxied by 
Radios, in reducing the effect of linguistic fractionalization remains significant through the 
interaction term.  
To illustrate the robustness of the results for the fractionalization and communications 
variables to the inclusion of social infrastructure proxies, column (5) of Table 5 reports the 
results obtained by again applying the general-to-specific simplification based on IV 
estimation commencing from a general model excluding GADP and YrsOpen. The variables 
selected are, apart from the excluded YrsOpen variable, identical to those in column (4) of 
Table 5, reinforcing the robustness of these results.  
An important feature of both the OLS and IV results is that, despite using an ‘agnostic’ 
model selection approach, linguistic fractionalization is consistently selected among the set of 
relevant explanatory variables. Overall, the empirical results provide strong statistical support 
for proposition 2. 
 
E. Economic Significance of Total Factor Productivity Results 
To assess the economic significance of the effect of social barriers to communication, we 
carried out a simple simulation. Taking the results from Table 4, column (2) as 
representative, the coefficients, which being statistically significant at the 5-percent level or 
better are all relatively precisely estimated, were used to predict the values of lnTFP for each 
country and these were transformed into levels. The 110 countries in the sample were then 
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sorted in ascending order on the basis of their values for Language.  The means of the 
predicted values of TFP in levels for the lower and upper quartile countries (defined as the 
bottom 27 and top 27 countries in terms of the ranking with respect to Language) were then 
calculated.   
The ratio of the mean predicted TFP values for the quartile with the lowest measure of 
linguistic fractionalization, relative to the mean predicted TFP values for the quartile with the 
highest measure of linguistic fractionalization, is greater than two (2.293). This implies that 
the effects of social barriers to communication are economically as well as statistically 
significant in explaining cross-country variation in TFP levels. If taken at face value, and 
given that all other causal factors between the two sets of countries are accounted for by our 
model, the results suggest that if countries with the highest levels of linguistic 
fractionalization were to ‘bridge’ the language barriers to the same extent as nations with the 
lowest levels of fractionalization, they could initiate a very large and positive productivity 
jump.  
Together with other explanatory factors, such as measures of institutional quality and 
openness to trade, our results provide a plausible explanation for the large disparity in 
productivity across countries, and why these differences may not necessarily decline over 
time.  
 
V. Economic Effects of Social Barriers to Communication 
Our model emphasizes the social dimension of cross-country economic differences rather 
than simply differences in levels of capital (human and physical). It also explains or supports 
a number of important stylized facts, and thus goes further than the literature on social 
cohesion and polarization (Bénabou 1996; Gradstein and Justman 2002), or existing 
explanations for cross-country differences in TFP (Parente and Prescott 2000).  
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Our results address three key features of economic performance. One, the on-going high 
performance of leading industrialized countries; two, the ability of a few countries to initiate 
‘catch up’ with economic leaders; and three, the reason why some countries remain growth 
laggards (Easterly and Levine 2001; Pritchett 1997). To the extent that increased knowledge 
connections contribute to higher levels of trust and cooperation between individuals, our 
results also provide a possible explanation for the positive empirical relationship between 
social capital and human capital accumulation (Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote 2002).  
 
A. High Productivity Performance 
We emphasize that diversity across individuals, per se, is not detrimental to productivity 
because differences provide the basis for mutually beneficial exchanges and the ‘cross-
fertilization’ of knowledge and ideas — a point made by John Stuart Mill (1848, p. 594) over 
150 years ago. Rather, it is the associated higher costs of and barriers to group-to-group 
communication that act as an impediment to increases in productivity and factor 
accumulation that diversity would otherwise bring. Indeed, radial, spanning or bridging 
connections at an individual level, are strongly associated with early adoption of technologies 
(Valente, 1995, p. 42; Meyer, 1998). Our results support this finding on a national level with 
evidence that factors that inhibit radial or bridging links, such as linguistic barriers, lower 
economy-wide productivity. 
We speculate that a comparative lack of social barriers to communication may, in part, 
explain the high productivity of the United States (US), which has a common language and is 
a multicultural and pluralistic society with a geographically and socially mobile population 
(Borjas 1992). Thus countries, like the US, that have a common language and a unifying 
culture can reap the benefits from complementary knowledge sets inherent in different social 
groups. By contrast, countries that are less socially diverse and mobile than the US, or that 
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are diverse but have major impediments (social, physical and institutional) to group-to-group 
communications, may be productivity ‘laggards’ because of less effective radial or bridging 
links across groups.  
 
B. Productivity ‘Catch Up’ 
Our modeling offers insights as to how countries might engineer a ‘catch up’ in terms of 
productivity by fostering approaches that mitigate barriers to communication across social 
groups. For example, the offering of common national curricula to reduce social distance 
(Gradstein and Justman 2002), subsidizing citizenship and native language classes for 
immigrants, promoting a common official language (Lazear 1999), and investing in mass 
communications (such as internet access and communication links) are all approaches that 
may raise productivity by reducing the costs of establishing knowledge links across 
individuals.  
To some extent, such measures have been adopted to varying degrees by countries, but  
without a full recognition of their economic benefits for both productivity and factor 
accumulation. In sum, national policies could positively influence economic growth provided 
they lower the social communication costs that impede the creation and diffusion of 
productivity-enhancing ideas. 
 
C. Stylized Facts 
We have explored the concept and consequences of social barriers to communication at an 
economy level, but our results are also consistent with a number of important findings at a 
regional and global level. These stylized facts provide additional support for our 
interpretation as to why social, and especially linguistic, barriers have a negative affect on 
productivity and factor accumulation.  
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Lazear (1999), Rauch (2001), Rauch and Trindade (2002), and others, have identified the 
importance of a common language in trade, but their explanation is that ethnic networks 
alleviate the difficulties of enforcing contracts, provide information on trade opportunities 
and help match buyers and sellers. Our work also emphasizes the importance of trade and 
migration flows, but we stress the importance of the transmission of ideas whereby 
knowledge connections across social groups provide a basis for productivity gains.  
Our thesis that economy-wide productivity is positively affected by knowledge 
connections across agents also has empirical support in the spillover literature. For instance, 
Park (2004) finds, using OECD data on cross-country student flows, that the return of 
foreign-educated workers is an empirically important channel for research and development 
spillovers. Our findings are also consistent with empirical work by Javorcik (2004); she uses 
individual firm-level data to show positive productivity spillovers from contacts between 
domestic firms and their foreign affiliates. Moretti (2004) also finds empirical evidence for 
human capital spillovers in manufacturing plants within the same city that are increasing in 
the level of interactions between workers across industries. An individual example of 
knowledge spillovers of the type we hypothesize is reported by Easterly (2002, pp. 145-148); 
he describes how a single person played a lead role in developing the garment industry in 
Bangladesh following the transfer of tacit knowledge via South Korea.  
At a local or regional level a number of distinguished thinkers, including Schelling (1978) 
and Tarde (1895), have observed the tendency for ‘like-with-like’ interactions, known as 
homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954, p. 23). This is consistent with our model where 
establishing knowledge links with different agents is costly. Locations where people 
‘connect’ also exemplify how a lowering of the average costs of connecting across agents, 
equivalent to an increase in the bridging parameter in our model, promotes knowledge 
transfer and innovation. Thus our model is consistent with the existence of localized 
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productivity effects, and is supported by empirical evidence of localized and spatial patterns 
of patents (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1993; Bottazzi and Peri 2003). 
Finally, we emphasize that our hypothesis that increased agent-to-agent connections 
raises labor productivity and capital accumulation is supported by evidence that cities 
promote the formation of human capital (Borjas 1995; Glaeser and Maré 2001; Lucas 1988; 
Marshall 1916, p. 271; Moretti 2004). Our finding of a knowledge connections-augmented 
rate of return for capital (human or physical) in locations where people have lower 
‘connection’ costs, such as in cities, provides an explanation that goes beyond the matching 
of skilled workers (Kremer 1993) and human capital externalities (Lucas 1988) as to why 
factors of production agglomerate, and why capital might flow from poor to rich countries 
(Lucas 1990). In other words, lower social costs of communication in cities, and also in 
highly-productive countries, generate knowledge spillovers that augment the rate of return to 
factors in such locations and induce accumulation. 
 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper addresses the question: what explains the huge variation in productivity across 
countries? In an optimal growth model that incorporates social barriers to communication, 
measured by a ‘bridging’ parameter, we derive dynamic implications for both transitional and 
steady-state levels of productivity, per-capita consumption and capital. The model generates 
testable propositions: greater social barriers to communication reduce economy-wide 
productivity, and also lower transitory and steady-state levels of per-capita consumption and 
capital.  
Theoretical propositions are tested using cross-country data from up to 118 countries. The 
empirical results obtained from OLS and instrumental variable estimation, and with an 
extensive set of diagnostic and robustness tests, are statistically and economically significant. 
These regressions provide strong support for the theoretical result that lower levels of a 
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‘bridging’ parameter, as measured by linguistic fractionalization, reduce total factor 
productivity. Some evidence is also found that the effects of social barriers to communication 
may be mitigated by improvements in mass communications. The empirical findings also 
show that the greater the initial social barriers to communication, as measured by a base-
period ethnolinguistic fractionalization index, the smaller is the increase in the stock of 
human capital and physical capital.  
Our findings and interpretation of the economic effects of social barriers to 
communication are broadly consistent with a number of stylized facts including the 
importance of spillovers in research and development, in human capital formation, and in 
localized productivity effects, and the flow of capital to places where people ‘connect’. The 
theory and empirical evidence together provide an important explanation for the large cross-
country differences in total factor productivity, and also generate fresh insights as to how 
countries might initiate productivity ‘catch up’.   
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 APPENDIX A: COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN SAMPLE 
 
The following countries are included in the sample for the regressions in Table 4, 
columns (1) to (3): Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, 
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, 
Gabon, The Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, 
Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, South Korea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, 
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
APPENDIX B: DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS 
lnTFP: Hall and Jones measure of total factor productivity (in natural logs) in 1998. Source: 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
 
Ethnic, Language, Religion:  Fractionalization indexes for ethnic, linguistic and religious 
groups. Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
 
Culture: Cultural fractionalization index accounting for cultural distances between groups 
based on language. Source: Fearon (2003) 
 
GADP: index of ‘government antidiversion policies’ calculated as the average of five 
International Country Risk Guide measures (1985-1995) law and order, bureaucratic quality, 
corruption, risk of expropriation, government repudiation of contracts, [0-1] range. Source: 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
 
YrsOpen: Sachs and Warner (1995) index of fraction of years open during 1950 to 1994 
period. [0, 1] range. Source: Hall and Jones (1999) 
 
Telephones: Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people) in 1988. Source: World Bank (2000). 
 
Popn Density: Population density (people per sq km) in 1988. Source: World Bank (2000). 
 
Radios: Radios (per 1,000 people) 1989. Source: World Bank (2000). 
 
Road Density: Roads/Land Area in 1988 or nearest year. Source: Total roads (kms) in 1988, 
or nearest year, from Canning (1998); Land Area (in sq km) from World Bank (2000). 
 
MeanTemp: Mean annual temperature (degrees Celsius) in 1987. Source: McArthur and 
Sachs (2001, Appendix) 
 
LT100km: Proportion of land area within 100km of the seacoast. Source: McArthur and Sachs 
(2001, Appendix) 
 
LandArea: Land area (sq km). Source: World Bank (2000). 
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EurFrac: Fraction of population speaking a major Western European language: English, 
French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish. Source: Hall and Jones (1999) 
 
lnFraRom: Natural log of the Frankel-Romer predicted trade share (computed from a gravity 
model based on population and geography). Source: Hall and Jones (1999) 
 
StateHist: Measures the length and coverage of formal states in current geographical borders 
from 1 to 1950. Source: Statehist5 from Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman (2002) 
 
ELF: Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization – Average value of five different indices (range 0 to 
1). Source: La Porta et al. (1999, Appendix B).   
 
lnRGDPW60: Real GDP (chain) per worker (1996 international prices) (in natural logs). 
Source: Penn World Tables 6.1 
 
lnKAPW: Real non-residential capital stock per worker (1985 international prices) (in natural 
logs). Source: Penn World Tables 5.6 
 
AYS: Average schooling years in the total population (aged 15 years and over). Source: Barro 
and Lee (2001) 
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 TABLE 1 – SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR KEY VARIABLES 
 N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
lnTFP 110 7.9570 0.7195 6.2845 9.0154 
Ethnic 110 0.4424 0.2763 0.0000 0.9302 
Language 110 0.3771 0.3028 0.0021 0.9227 
Religion 110 0.4217 0.2500 0.0028 0.8603 
Culture 106 0.2951 0.2156 0.0000 0.7330 
GADP 110 0.6167 0.1958 0.3080 1.0000 
YrsOpen 110 0.3581 0.3453 0.0000 1.0000 
Telephones 110 128.19 176.86 0.6224 663.94 
Popn Density 110 189.00 680.06 1.5527 5683.4 
Radios 110 379.25 344.95 0.2517 2119.3 
Road Density 110 0.5450 0.9323 0.0043 4.7438 
ELF 82 0.3451 0.2975 0.0000 0.8902 
∆AYS 82 2.7558 1.2827 −0.8050 6.5910 
AYS60 82 3.8318 2.4689 0.1160 9.7260 
∆lnKAPW 57 0.8840 0.6248 −0.5495 3.0909 
lnKAPW65 57 8.3797 1.3194 4.6347 10.536 
lnRGDPW60 82 8.8213 0.9268 6.5403 10.376 
N is the number of observations. N = 110 corresponds to the sample used in Table 4, columns (1)-(3), N 
= 106 to Table 4, column (4), N = 82 to Table 2, column (1), and N = 57 to Table 2, column (4). 
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TABLE 2 – CHANGES IN CAPITAL STOCKS AND SOCIAL BARRIERS TO 
COMMUNICATION 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable  
∆AYS ∆AYS ∆AYS ∆lnKAPW ∆lnKAPW ∆lnKAPW 
Constant −1.586 
(2.097) 
−1.842 
(1.865) 
0.062 
(2.051) 
1.955 
(0.965) 
0.837 
(0.948) 
2.309 
(0.924) 
Ethnic −1.672 
(0.741) 
  −0.843 
(0.355) 
  
Language 0.160 
(0.654) 
  −0.166 
(0.342) 
  
Religion 0.283 
(0.615) 
  −0.034 
(0.312) 
  
Culture  −1.168 
(0.697) 
  −0.504 
(0.428) 
 
ELF   −1.263 
(0.566) 
  −1.187 
(0.340) 
AYS60 −0.286 
(0.091) 
−0.242 
(0.082) 
−0.204 
(0.082) 
   
lnKAPW60    −0.382 
(0.105) 
−0.374 
(0.114) 
−0.426 
(0.101) 
lnRGDPW60 0.678 
(0.247) 
0.664 
(0.227) 
0.443 
(0.243) 
0.278 
(0.158) 
0.366 
(0.171) 
0.272 
(0.149) 
       
Diagnostics       
R2 0.185 0.168 0.158 0.301 0.198 0.331 
Regression SE 1.208 1.214 1.200 0.547 0.590 0.521 
N 82 79 82 57 54 56 
Normality 0.527 2.279 2.048 3.516 3.014 5.565 
 [p-value] [0.769] [0.320] [0.359] [0.172] [0.222] [0.062] 
White-Hetero 1.043 1.064 1.659 1.520 2.843 2.470 
 [p-value] [0.418] [0.392] [0.143] [0.163] [0.019] [0.036] 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and p-values for diagnostic tests in square brackets. Normality is the 
Doornik-Hansen test of normal errors and White-Hetero is White’s test for heteroskedasticity. 
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TABLE 3 – DETERMINANTS OF TFP: OLS RESULTS 
Dependent 
variable: lnTFP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 8.533 
(0.138) 
[0.142] 
7.206 
(0.260) 
[0.300] 
7.237 
(0.213) 
[0.183]
7.297 
(0.273)
[0.243]
7.342 
(0.369) 
[0.423] 
5.905 
(0.300) 
[0.278] 
Ethnic −0.755 
(0.301) 
[0.274] 
0.182 
(0.283) 
[0.290] 
 0.311 
(0.311)
[0.283]
0.148 
(0.335) 
[0.341] 
−0.233 
(0.311) 
[0.339] 
Language −0.567 
(0.278) 
[0.251] 
−0.532 
(0.229) 
[0.211] 
 −0.763 
(0.244)
[0.259]
−0.560 
(0.260) 
[0.231] 
−0.652 
(0.251) 
[0.297] 
Religion −0.087 
(0.254) 
[0.279] 
−0.417 
(0.220) 
[0.223] 
 −0.465 
(0.211)
[0.229]
−0.502 
(0.272) 
[0.281] 
−0.070 
(0.270) 
[0.260] 
Culture   −0.618 
(0.244) 
[0.213]
   
GADP  1.310 
(0.395) 
[0.364] 
0.952 
(0.353) 
[0.280]
1.273 
(0.407)
[0.367]
1.190 
(0.603) 
[0.614] 
2.293 
(0.463) 
[0.432] 
YrsOpen  0.644 
(0.206) 
[0.189] 
0.853 
(0.199) 
[0.180]
0.655 
(0.201)
[0.200]
0.588 
(0.235) 
[0.206] 
0.672 
(0.231) 
[0.225] 
       
Diagnostics       
R2 0.243 0.494 0.470 0.575 0.336 0.722 
Regression SE 0.644 0.531 0.527 0.479 0.578 0.516 
N 118 118 113 108 96 88 
Normality 7.936 2.467 0.037 2.365 1.920 0.679 
 [p-value] [0.019] [0.291] [0.982] [0.307] [0.383] [0.712] 
White-Hetero 1.351 2.739 5.073 3.285 1.714 0.919 
 [p-value] [0.241] [0.005] [0.0001] [0.001] [0.091] [0.521] 
Notes: Conventional standard errors are in parentheses and heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in 
square brackets.  Normality is the Doornik-Hansen test of normal errors and White-Hetero is White’s 
test for heteroskedasticity.  The sample used in column (4) omits influential observations and/or 
outliers, and in column (5) omits OECD countries.  In column (6) the dependent variable is Islam’s 
(1995) measure of lnTFP. 
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TABLE 4 – DETERMINANTS OF TFP: ROBUSTNESS RESULTS 
Dependent variable: 
lnTFP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 8.079 
(0.502) 
8.072 
(0.118) 
8.292 
(0.152) 
7.706 
(0.107) 
Ethnic 0.122 
(0.305) 
   
Language −1.331 
(0.908) 
−0.755 
(0.219) 
−0.981 
(0.311) 
 
Religion −0.501 
(0.258) 
−0.507 
(0.217) 
−0.705 
(0.328) 
 
Culture    −0.570 
(0.245) 
GADP −0.171 
(0.922) 
   
YrsOpen 0.206 
(0.393) 
  0.722 
(0.203) 
Telephones 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.0004)
0.001 
(0.0006)
0.001 
(0.0004) 
Popn Density 0.00001 
(0.00003) 
   
Radios −0.0001 
(0.0005) 
   
Road Density 0.017 
(0.117) 
   
Language*Telephones −0.002 
(0.003) 
   
Language*Radios 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.0006)
0.002 
(0.0007)
 
Language*Popn Density 0.0003 
(0.001) 
   
Language*Road Density -0.025 
(0.407) 
   
Language*GADP 1.032 
(1.859) 
   
Language*YrsOpen 0.103 
(0.887) 
   
     
Diagnostics     
R2 0.533 0.509 0.490 0.464 
Regression SE 0.530 0.514 0.528 0.524 
N 110 110 110 106 
Normality 3.273 3.867  0.067 
 [p-value] [0.195] [0.145]  [0.967] 
White-Hetero 1.524 1.412  1.639 
 [p-value] [0.071] [0.114]  [0.049] 
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses and p-values for diagnostic tests in square 
brackets.  Results in columns (1), (2) and (4) are obtained using OLS. Results in column 
(3) are median regression estimates.  
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TABLE 5 – DETERMINANTS OF TFP: IV RESULTS 
Dependent 
variable: lnTFP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 7.735 
(0.529) 
7.798 
(0.501) 
8.228 
(0.132) 
8.003 
(0.203) 
8.308 
(0.127) 
Ethnic −0.001 
(0.373) 
    
Language −0.540 
(0.268) 
 −1.056 
(0.272) 
−0.838 
(0.267) 
−1.142 
(0.219) 
Religion −0.299 
(0.333) 
 −0.558 
(0.237) 
−0.525 
(0.268) 
−0.750 
(0.246) 
Culture  −0.800 
(0.326) 
   
GADP 0.112 
(1.136) 
−0.468 
(1.078) 
   
YrsOpen 1.479 
(0.657) 
1.999 
(0.687) 
 0.871 
(0.458) 
 
Telephones   0.001 
(0.0006) 
  
Road Density    0.147 
(0.158) 
0.362 
(0.113) 
Language*Radios   0.002 
(0.0009) 
0.002 
(0.0009)
0.003 
(0.0007) 
      
Diagnostics      
R2 0.476 0.376 0.523 0.536 0.511 
Regression SE 0.544 0.610 0.506 0.499 0.510 
N 91 91 99 88 88 
Sargan χ2 
[p-value] 
1.887 
[0.596] 
2.216 
[0.529] 
5.374 
[0.146] 
2.556 
[0.923] 
6.084 
[0.638] 
Hausman χ2 
[p-value] 
3.386 
[0.184] 
5.819 
[0.055] 
1.990 
[0.370] 
6.849 
[0.077] 
6.612 
[0.037] 
R2 for first-stage regressions 
GADP 0.741 0.667    
YrsOpen 0.512 0.522  0.571 
Telephones   0.703   
Road Density    0.475 
Language*Radios   0.663 0.730 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are given in parentheses and p-values in square brackets.  R2 for IV 
regressions is calculated as the squared correlation- between the observed and predicted values of the 
dependent variable.  Sargan χ2 is Sargan’s misspecification test for IV estimation and Hausman χ2 is a 
test for the consistency of the corresponding OLS estimates.   
Instrument sets: Column (1): Ethnic, Language, Religion, MeanTemp, LT100km, StatHist, EurFrac, 
lnFraRom; Column (2): Culture, MeanTemp, LT100km, StatHist, EurFrac, lnFraRom; Column (3): 
Language, Religion, Meantemp, LT100km and the interaction of MeanTemp, LT100km and LandArea 
with Language; Columns (4) and (5): Ethnic, Language, Religion, StatHist, EurFrac, lnFraRom, 
MeanTemp, LT100km, LandArea and the interaction of each of the last three variables with language. 
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1  Substitution of (9) and (10) into (8) also allows us to derive the transition path for s.  
2 Hall and Jones note that their estimates are very similar to those obtained in Hall and Jones (1996) 
where “…the production function is not restricted to Cobb-Douglas, and factor shares are allowed to 
vary across countries” (Hall and Jones 1999, p. 93). 
3  Alesina et al. (2003) include their three measures of fractionalization as regressors in models where 
the regressand is per capita income or various quality-of-government indexes, but do not test for the 
effects on TFP. 
4 Given the way the components are measured, high values of GADP are conducive to supporting 
production. 
5 The cut off values used were 2 for the studentized residuals and 2k/N for the leverage statistics 
(Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980). 
6 The diagnostic tests implemented in the search algorithm were the Normality and White-Hetero 
tests, discussed above, plus F-tests for parameter constancy for breakpoints at the sample mid-point 
and 90th percentile.  For the diagnostic tests, a 1-percent significance level was used throughout to 
help control the overall null-rejection probability, as suggested by the Monte Carlo evidence in 
Krolzig and Hendry (2001). 
7 A complete listing of the PcGets algorithm is available in Hendry and Krolzig  (2001, Appendix A1) 
or Krolzig and Hendry (2001, Tables 1 and 2). 
8 In this context, power and size relate to the probabilities of retaining in the final model variables that 
are, respectively, included and not included in the data generating process. 
9 Use of a general-to-specific modeling approach also helps address the issue of model uncertainty 
(Brock and Durlauf 2001; Durlauf 2002). 
10 Excluding the constant, only the coefficient on Religion is statistically significant at the 10-percent 
level (on a two-tailed test), with the coefficients on Language and Telephones significant at the 15-
pecent level. 
11 This index rates the territory of the current geographical boundaries of a country in terms of 
whether the government is above tribal level, is colonial or locally based, and the territorial coverage 
of the government for 50 year sub-periods from 0 to 1950. A single observation for each country is 
obtained by discounting the effect of past values.  We use the preferred measure of Bocksette, 
Chanda, and Putterman (2002) corresponding to a discount rate of five percent. 
12 Note that although Road Density is retained in the final model in column (4), it is not statistically 
significant at conventional significance levels; at each stage of the simplification process, the Gets 
algorithm retains variables whose exclusion would lead to lack of congruence (as judged by 
significant values for any of the diagnostic tests). 
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